Deregulation or Governmental Intervention? A Counterfactual Perspective on China's Electricity Market Reform
Deregulation or Governmental Intervention? A Counterfactual Perspective on China's Electricity Market Reform
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1749-124x.2013.12030.x
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发表时间：
2013-07
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Sumei Chen;Lingyun He
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Sumei Chen;Lingyun He
中国长期以来严重的电力短缺问题引发了人们对中国是否应该进一步推进电力市场化改革的争论。本文通过分析发电部门和零售活动放松管制对其他部门、宏观经济和电力用户的影响来解决这一问题。基于简化的可计算一般均衡框架，采用了反事实情景分析。我们发现，放松管制可以显著提高电力生产效率，增加就业，提高家庭福利。这些重要的发现有助于解决许多关于中国经济转型期间政府干预的争议。我们的研究结果对政策的可行性和适用性有两个启示；也就是说，应该逐步引入电力零售市场的竞争，并考虑对现有企业失业的必要安排。关键词：中国，可计算一般均衡，放松管制，电力行业，情景分析jel代码：C68， L43, L98
Abstract The long-standing severe power shortage in China has provoked much debate on whetherChina should further promote market-oriented electricity reform. The present paper addressesthis issue by analyzing the impacts of deregulation of the electricity generation sector andretailing activities on other sectors, the macroeconomy and electricity users. A counterfactualscenario analysis is used based on a simplified computable general equilibrium framework.We find that deregulation can significantly improve the efficiency of electricity production,increase employment and enhance household welfare. These nontrivial findings can help toresolve many controversies about governmental intervention during China’s economictransition. Our findings have two implications relating to policy feasibility and applicability;that is, competition in the electricity retail market should be phased in, and the necessaryarrangements for unemployment in incumbent firms should be considered. Key words: China, computable general equilibrium, deregulation, electricity industry,scenario analysisJEL codes: C68, L43, L98