Counteracting leakage power analysis attack using random ring oscillators
Counteracting leakage power analysis attack using random ring oscillators
复制标题
使用随机环形振荡器抵消泄漏功率分析攻击
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Hongming Liu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
N. Zhu;Yujie Zhou;Hongming Liu
泄漏功率分析(LPA)攻击的目的是从静态(泄漏)功率的测量中恢复密码设备的秘密密钥，而不是传统的专注于动态功率的功率分析攻击。这种新型的功耗分析攻击利用了CMOS集成电路的漏电功率与其处理的数据的相关性。随着集成电路技术的发展，LPA攻击正在成为对亚100 nm工艺密码电路信息安全的严重威胁。提出了一种基于随机环振荡器的低功率放大器对抗电路，有效地抵抗了低功率放大器攻击。高级加密标准算法中的关键S盒的实现表明，使用随机环振荡器对抗可以抵抗LPA攻击。此外，对抗电路还可以安装在S盒结构的不同对称算法上。基于我们的方法，可以在不超过2K额外门数的情况下，提出一种能够保持相同吞吐量的抗LPA的AES芯片。仿真结果表明，本文提出的对策是实现抗LPA密码处理器的一种很有前途的方法。
Leakage power analysis (LPA) attacks aim at recovering the secret key of a cryptographic device from measurements of its static (leakage) power, as opposite to traditional power analysis attacks that are focused on the dynamic power. This novel power analysis attacks take advantage of the dependence of the leakage power of CMOS integrated circuits on the data they process. With the development of integrated circuits technology, LPA attacks are becoming a serious threat to the information security of cryptographic circuits in sub-100-nm technologies. This paper proposes a LPA countermeasure circuit based on random ring oscillators, which efficiently resists the LPA attacks. The implementation of the critical S-Box of the advanced encryption standard (AES) algorithm shows that using countermeasure of random ring oscillators can thwart LPA attack. Moreover, the countermeasure circuit can be mounted onto different symmetric algorithm which has S-Box architecture. Based on our approach, a LPA-resistant AES chip can be proposed to maintain the same throughput with less than 2K extra gates. Simulation results show the countermeasure proposed in this paper is a promising approach to implement a LPA-resistant crypto processor.