Criticality and Environmental Uncertainty in Step-Level Public Goods Dilemmas.
Criticality and Environmental Uncertainty in Step-Level Public Goods Dilemmas.
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阶梯级公共产品困境中的关键性和环境不确定性。
DOI：
10.1037/1089-2699.8.1.40
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
W. W. Au
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
W. W. Au
作者在一个序贯游戏协议范式中考察了环境不确定性下的公共产品困境。使用一个5人的游戏，实验1检查规定点（PP）的不确定性，并发现，一定的PP需要3个贡献者产生的PG更频繁地比一个不确定的PP相同的期望，均匀变化之间的2，3，和4个贡献者。固定PP为3，实验2表明，PG提供率高于一定的组大小的5人比一个不确定的组大小相同的期望，均匀地变化之间的4，5，6人。进一步的分析表明，担心浪费自己的贡献和对环境不确定性的悲观信念可能会破坏贡献。
The author examined a public goods (PG) dilemma with environmental uncertainty in a sequential protocol of play paradigm. Using a 5-person game, Experiment 1 examined provision point (PP) uncertainty and found that a certain PP requiring 3 contributors produced the PG more frequently than an uncertain PP of the same expectation that varied uniformly among 2, 3, and 4 contributors. Fixing PP at 3, Experiment 2 showed that PG provision rate was higher with a certain group size of 5 persons than an uncertain group size of the same expectation that varied uniformly among 4, 5, and 6 persons. Further analyses showed that a fear of wasting one's contribution and pessimistic beliefs of environmental uncertainty could have undermined contribution.