A DEFENSE OF IMPRECISE CREDENCES IN INFERENCE AND DECISION MAKING
A DEFENSE OF IMPRECISE CREDENCES IN INFERENCE AND DECISION MAKING
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1520-8583.2010.00194.x
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发表时间：
2010-12-01
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Joyce, James M.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Joyce, James M.
1.信念不是要么全有要么全无。意见有不同的力量等级，从对真理的完全确定，通过对真理和对错误的平等信心，到完全确定错误。2.等级信念受概率法则的支配，该法则规定了理性意见必须符合的归纳一致性(或“连贯性”)的最低标准。
1. Belief is not all-or-nothing. Opinions come in varying gradations of strength which can range from full certainty of truth, through equal confidence in truth and falsehood, to complete certainty of falsehood. 2. Gradational beliefs are governed by the laws of probability, which codify minimum standards of inductive consistency (or" coherence") to which rational opinions must conform.