Identifying Sorting-In Theory
Identifying Sorting-In Theory
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DOI：
10.1093/restud/rdq034
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发表时间：
2011-07-01
影响因子：
5.8
通讯作者：
Kircher, Philipp
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Eeckhout, Jan;Kircher, Philipp
工人和企业之间的搭配提供了生产中互补性或替代性的证据。互补性的存在对于旨在实现资源最佳分配的政策很重要，G.失业保险。我们认为，单独使用工资数据，它几乎是不可能的，以确定是否匹配是积极的或消极的。即使我们不能识别排序的符号，我们可以识别强度，即交叉偏置的大小和相关的福利损失。我们首先表明，一个给定的工人的工资是非单调的类型，他的雇主。这是因为在排序模型中，工资反映了不匹配的机会成本。我们分析表明，这种非单调性防止标准公司的固定效应与真实类型的公司。然后，我们提出了一个替代的程序，测量的强度排序存在的搜索摩擦。知道排序的强度有助于测量由于失配引起的输出损失。
Assortative matching between workers and firms provides evidence of the complementarities or substitutes in production. The presence of complementarities is important for policies that aim to achieve the optimal allocation of resources, e. g. unemployment insurance. We argue that using wage data alone, it is virtually impossible to identify whether assortative matching is positive or negative. Even though we cannot identify the sign of the sorting, we can identify the strength, i.e. the magnitude of the cross-partial and the associated welfare loss. We first show that the wage for a given worker is non-monotonic in the type of his employer. This is due to the fact that in a sorting model, wages reflect the opportunity cost of mismatch. We analytically show that this non-monotonicity prevents standard firm fixed effects to correlate with the true type of the firm. We then propose an alternative procedure that measures the strength of sorting in the presence of search frictions. Knowing the strength of sorting facilitates the measurement of the output loss due to mismatch.