Institutional ownership and monitoring: Evidence from financial misreporting
Institutional ownership and monitoring: Evidence from financial misreporting
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2010.06.001
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发表时间：
2010-09
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
Natasha Burns;Simi Kedia;M. Lipson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Natasha Burns;Simi Kedia;M. Lipson
我们发现，财务误报的可能性和严重程度与总机构所有权呈正相关，而这种影响在很大程度上可归因于投资期限较短的机构的所有权——这些机构几乎没有动力对公司活动进行成本高昂的监控，而恰恰是那些在重述公告时卖出的机构。我们还发现，这些机构的股权集中抵消了这种影响，这表明股权集中会引发更大的监督，并减轻了企业误报的动机。我们的研究结果表明，短视企业决策与机构所有权之间的任何联系都可能与机构监督的性质有关。
We find that the likelihood and severity of financial misreporting is positively related to aggregate institutional ownership and this effect can be largely attributed to ownership by institutions with short investment horizons — those with little incentive to engage in costly monitoring of firm activities and precisely those that sell at the announcement of a restatement. We also find that the concentration of holdings by these institutions offsets this effect, which suggests concentrated ownership induces greater monitoring and mitigates the incentives for firms to misreport. Our results suggest that any link between myopic firm decision making and institutional ownership may be related to the nature of institutional monitoring.