Does Information Revelation Improve Revenue?
Does Information Revelation Improve Revenue?
复制标题
信息披露会提高收入吗？
DOI：
10.1145/2940716.2940789
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Christos Tzamos
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. Daskalakis;C. Papadimitriou;Christos Tzamos
我们在估值模型中研究了最佳拍卖设计的问题，这是由在线广告拍卖中明确促进的，其中有双向信息不对称，从某种意义上说，卖方（项目类型）都可以使用私人信息（项目类型）和竞标者（他们的类型），每个投标人的价值都取决于他自己和项目的类型。重要的是，我们允许任意拍卖格式，可能涉及卖方和投标人决策的几轮信号传导，并寻求找到最佳的信号和拍卖的共同设计（我们称此最佳为“最佳增强拍卖”）。我们通过建立与添加竞标者的多项贝叶斯拍卖来确定其评估模型的最佳增强拍卖。令人惊讶的是，在最佳的增强拍卖中，没有任何信号，实际上，卖方在投标人选择竞标之后，卖方不需要访问有关物品类型的可用信息。最近出现在最近的文献中出现的该问题的次优解决方案被证明与研究的方式相对应，以通过更简单的格式（例如大捆绑）近似多项目拍卖的方式（这对应于Myerson的拍卖而没有任何信息启示），单独销售项目（这对应于迈尔森的拍卖，如[Fu等人，2012]中的完整信息启示和分数（这对应于在迈尔森的拍卖之前，先于最佳信号传导）。因此，所有这些解决方案均与最佳收入相比。
We study the problem of optimal auction design in a valuation model, explicitly motivated by online ad auctions, in which there is two-way informational asymmetry, in the sense that private information is available to both the seller (the item type) and the bidders (their type), and the value of each bidder for the item depends both on his own and the item's type. Importantly, we allow arbitrary auction formats involving, potentially, several rounds of signaling from the seller and decisions by the bidders, and seek to find the optimum co-design of signaling and auction (we call this optimum the "optimum augmented auction"). We characterize exactly the optimum augmented auction for our valuation model by establishing its equivalence with a multi-item Bayesian auction with additive bidders. Surprisingly, in the optimum augmented auction there is no signaling whatsoever, and in fact the seller need not access the available information about the item type until after the bidder chooses his bid. Suboptimal solutions to this problem, which have appeared in the recent literature, are shown to correspond to well-studied ways to approximate multi-item auctions by simpler formats, such as grand-bundling (this corresponds to Myerson's auction without any information revelation), selling items separately (this corresponds to Myerson's auction preceded by full information revelation as in [Fu et al. 2012]), and fractional partitioning (this corresponds to Myerson's auction preceded by optimal signaling). Consequently, all these solutions are separated by large approximation gaps from the optimum revenue.
DOI：
10.1145/2764468.2764539
发表时间：
2014-09
期刊：
Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
影响因子：
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作者：
C. Daskalakis;Alan Deckelbaum;Christos Tzamos
通讯作者：
C. Daskalakis;Alan Deckelbaum;Christos Tzamos