Monetary Union with Voluntary Participation
Monetary Union with Voluntary Participation
复制标题
自愿参与的货币联盟
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-937x.2006.00382.x
复制
发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
F. Lippi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
W. Fuchs;F. Lippi
货币联盟被模拟为一种技术，它使突然的政策偏差成为不可能，但要求自愿参与的国家遵循相同的货币政策。在一个完全动态的背景下，我们确定的条件下，这种安排可能会主导一个协调的系统与独立的国家货币。自愿参与假设带来了两个新的结果。首先，最优策略是响应agentsi？通过使当前和未来的政策向有利于他们的方向倾斜，激励他们离开工会。这与静态性质的最优政策时，参与是外生的假设，并意味着在联盟的政策是不是完全由整个地区的发展，但偶尔考虑到成员国i？国家发展的一半。第二，我们表明，可能存在的国家的世界中，联盟分裂，因为在一些历史事件发生。因此，本文首次正式分析了货币联盟形成、可持续性和破坏背后的激励因素。
A Monetary Union is modeled as a technology that makes a surprise policy deviation impossible but requires voluntarily participating countries to follow the same monetary policy. Within a fully dynamic context, we identify conditions under which such arrangement may dominate a coordinated system with independent national currencies. Two new results are delivered by the voluntary participation assumption. First, optimal policy is shown to respond to the agentsi?½ incentives to leave the union by tilting both current and future policy in their favor. This contrasts with the static nature of optimal policy when participation is exogenously assumed and implies that policy in the union is not exclusively guided by area-wide developments but does occasionally take account of member countriesi?½ national developments. Second we show that there might exist states of the world in which the union breaks apart, as occurred in some historical episodes. The paper thus provides a first formal analysis of the incentives behind the formation, sustainability and disruption of a Monetary Union.
影响因子：
6.1
作者：
ABREU, D
通讯作者：
ABREU, D