Dynamic communication mechanism design
Dynamic communication mechanism design
复制标题
动态沟通机制设计
DOI：
10.1007/s00355-021-01309-y
复制
发表时间：
2021
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Ryuji Sano
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
山本圭;山本圭;冨樫あゆみ;冨樫あゆみ;Ryuji Sano
我们认为在一个准线性环境中的动态通信机制与一维类型。机制设计者通过在不同阶段迭代地向代理人提供价格来逐渐识别代理人的估值。代理人支付的最高价格，他们接受，如果他们的理想的决定是作出。我们表明，在弱紧机制，如果一个沟通机制是事后激励兼容，那么它是一个单调价格机制。英式拍卖是一类满足事后激励相容性和效率的机制。
We consider dynamic communication mechanisms in a quasi-linear environment with single-dimensional types. The mechanism designer gradually identifies agents’ valuations by iteratively offering prices to agents at different stages. Agents pay the maximum price they accepted if their desirable decision is made. We show that within weakly tight mechanisms, if a communication mechanism is ex-post incentive compatible, then it is a monotone-price mechanism. English auctions are characterized as a class of mechanisms that satisfy ex-post incentive compatibility and efficiency.