The Brussels effect: how the European Union rules the world
The Brussels effect: how the European Union rules the world
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布鲁塞尔效应：欧盟如何统治世界
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发表时间：
2020
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通讯作者：
Derek Hawes
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作者：
Derek Hawes
在布拉德福德女士看来，欧盟“统治世界”是因为其内部市场的规模，也因为它建立了一个制度架构，将其市场规模转化为“有形的监管影响力”（第25页）。此外，其主要利益相关者进一步将严格监管视为建设更美好社会的关键，为雄心勃勃的监管议程提供了关键的政治支持。然而，尽管这本 400 页的巨著充满了纯粹的奉承，但就连布拉德福德女士也发现，随着民粹主义政党在许多成员国中日益壮大，欧盟面临着越来越多的独特挑战。作者勉强地承认，这些声音的力量日益增强，这意味着即使是一体化主义者，在“以牺牲国家主权为代价”扩大欧盟权力的呼吁中也变得越来越胆怯（第283页）。那么，“统治世界”就到此为止了！布拉德福德承认，诸如不受管理的移民和共同货币明显失败等危机，可能是对欧盟更广泛的监管议程和“布鲁塞尔效应”逐渐侵蚀的最大挑战。考虑到这些因素，除了质疑为什么本卷副标题中暗示的大胆行为被认为是合适的之外，很难做其他的事情，以及任何有能力的分析师如何才能相信，目前形式的欧盟代表着一个失败的机构，在适当的时候会解体。为什么？因为，从本质上讲，它不仅是不民主的，而且是积极反民主的；在一个充满冲突、战争、饥荒和独裁的世界里，这对于任何政治实体来说都不是一个好的立场。布拉德福德似乎也不清楚英国离开欧盟后将获得的监管主权的性质。她断言脱欧活动人士的此类承诺是不真实的，这是完全错误的。对其实施监管是一回事，而自愿采用类似标准（如果符合英国利益）则完全是另一回事。她认为“欧盟监管的挥之不去可能会让英国脱欧的支持者感到不安，他们被迫承认监管主权的承诺是没有根据的”（第282页），这是多么错误的观点。事实恰恰相反。充其量这本书已经过时了，而且在任何意义上都不是一本适合当前国际政治舞台的学生的书。然而，它将让未来研究 21 世纪政治的历史学家着迷，作为一个关于过度热情危险的实例教训。当布拉德福德女士邀请她的读者“质疑这本书是否会在未来几十年被视为当下的历史”时，她承认了这一点（第xix页）。
In Ms Bradford’s view, the European Union ‘Rules the World’ because of the size of its internal market and because it has built an institutional architecture that has converted its market size into ‘a tangible regulatory influence’ (p.25). In addition, its leading stakeholders have further embraced stringent regulation as a key towards a better society, giving the critical political backing for an ambitious regulatory agenda. However, despite this 400 page tome of unadulterated adulation, even Ms Bradford has detected that the EU faces increasing and distinctive challenges as populist parties are gaining strength in many member states. Grudgingly the author admits the growing strength of those voices means even the integrationists are growing timid in their calls for expanding EU powers ‘at the expense of national sovereignty’ (p.283). So much then, for ‘Ruling the World’! Bradford’s admission that crises such as that over unmanaged migration and the palpable failure of the common currency, represent perhaps the greatest challenge to the EU broader regulatory agenda and the gradual erosion of ‘The Brussels Effect’. It is difficult, in the light of these factors, to do other than query why the bravura implied in the sub-title to this volume was thought apposite and how any competent analyst could believe other than that the EU, in its present form, represents a failing institution that will, in due course, disintegrate. Why? Because, at its heart, it is not just undemocratic but positively anti-democratic; not a good stance for any political entity in a world riven by conflicts, wars, famine and dictatorships. Bradford also seems unclear as to the nature of the regulatory sovereignty the UK will gain now that they have left the Union. She is quite wrong to assert that such promises by the Brexit campaigners were untrue. It is one thing to have regulation imposed on one – quite another to voluntarily adopt similar standards if they are in the UK interests. How wrong she was to argue that ‘the lingering presence of EU regulations is likely to unsettle the proponents of Brexit who are forced to concede that the promises of regulatory sovereignty were unfounded’ (p.282). The opposite is true. At best this volume is out of date and is not in any sense a book for current students of the international political scene. It will however fascinate future historians of 21 Century politics as an object lesson in the dangers of over-enthusiasm; a point Ms Bradford acknowledges when she invites her readers to ‘question as to whether this book will be read as the history of the present in the decades to come’) (p.xix).