Decentralized Control: A Case Study of Russia
Decentralized Control: A Case Study of Russia
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DOI：
10.14722/ndss.2020.23098
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发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Reethika Ramesh;R. Raman;Matthew Bernhard;Victor Ongkowijaya;Leonid Evdokimov;A. Edmundson;Steven Sprecher;M. Ikram;Roya Ensafi
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文献类型：
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作者：
Reethika Ramesh;R. Raman;Matthew Bernhard;Victor Ongkowijaya;Leonid Evdokimov;A. Edmundson;Steven Sprecher;M. Ikram;Roya Ensafi
——到目前为止，审查制度研究主要集中在高度集中的网络上，这些网络依赖于政府运营的技术瓶颈，例如中国的防火墙。尽管以前被认为非常困难，但去中心化网络中的大规模审查正在增加。我们对俄罗斯去中心化信息控制机制的深入调查表明，这种大规模的审查制度可以通过廉价的商品设备在去中心化网络中实现。这种新形式的信息控制给审查测量带来了一系列问题，包括难以识别被审查的内容、需要从不同角度进行测量，以及需要付出巨大努力才能以稳健的方式识别的多样化审查机制。通过与俄罗斯当地的活动人士合作，我们获得了俄罗斯政府联邦大众传播服务机构 Roskomnadzor 签署的五份泄露的封锁名单，以及七年的历史封锁名单数据。该权威列表包含 ISP 自 2012 年 11 月 1 日起必须阻止的域名、IP 和子网。我们使用 2019 年 4 月 24 日起的阻止列表（其中包含 132,798 个域名、324,695 个 IP 和 39 个子网）从住宅、数据中心和基础设施有利位置收集主动测量数据。我们的优势涵盖 408 个独特的 AS，控制着约 65% 的俄罗斯 IP 地址空间。我们的研究结果表明，数据中心的阻止数量和阻止方法都与住宅 ISP 不同，导致住宅网络角度和数据中心角度的互联网体验不同。正如预期的那样，住宅的有利位置受到了严格的审查。虽然我们观察到一系列阻止技术，例如 TCP/IP 阻止、DNS 操纵
—Until now, censorship research has largely focused on highly centralized networks that rely on government-run technical choke-points, such as the Great Firewall of China. Although it was previously thought to be prohibitively difficult, large-scale censorship in decentralized networks are on the rise. Our in-depth investigation of the mechanisms underlying decentralized information control in Russia shows that such large-scale censorship can be achieved in decentralized networks through inexpensive commodity equipment. This new form of information control presents a host of problems for censorship measurement, including difficulty identifying censored content, requiring measurements from diverse perspectives, and variegated censorship mechanisms that require significant effort to identify in a robust manner. By working with activists on the ground in Russia, we obtained five leaked blocklists signed by Roskomnadzor, the Russian government’s federal service for mass communications, along with seven years of historical blocklist data. This authoritative list contains domains, IPs, and subnets that ISPs have been required to block since November 1st, 2012. We used the blocklist from April 24 2019, that contains 132,798 domains, 324,695 IPs, and 39 subnets, to collect active measurement data from residential, data center and infrastructural vantage points. Our vantage points span 408 unique ASes that control ≈ 65% of Russian IP address space. Our findings suggest that data centers block differently from the residential ISPs both in quantity and in method of blocking, resulting in different experiences of the Internet for residential network perspectives and data center perspectives. As expected, residential vantage points experience high levels of censorship. While we observe a range of blocking techniques, such as TCP/IP blocking, DNS manipulation