Macroeconomic Policy Games
Macroeconomic Policy Games
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宏观经济政策博弈
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2520201
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Joe LaBriola
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Martin Bodenstein;L. Guerrieri;Joe LaBriola
每当每个决策者都有不同的目标时，就会出现决策者之间的战略互动。偏离充分合作可能导致巨大的福利损失。为了促进战略互动的研究，我们开发了一个工具箱来描述全承诺和开环纳什博弈下的福利最大化合作拉姆齐政策。使用我们的工具箱的两个例子提供了一些新颖的结果。第一个例子回顾了两国模型中货币政策协调的案例，以确认我们的方法复制了文献中众所周知的结果，并通过强调它们对政策工具选择的敏感性来扩展这些结果。对于第二个例子，在一个有金融摩擦的模型中，中央银行和宏观审慎监管机构被赋予了不同的目标。即使技术冲击是波动的唯一来源，缺乏协调也会导致巨大的福利损失。
Strategic interactions between policymakers arise whenever each policymaker has distinct objectives. Deviating from full cooperation can result in large welfare losses. To facilitate the study of strategic interactions, we develop a toolbox that characterizes the welfare-maximizing cooperative Ramsey policies under full commitment and open-loop Nash games. Two examples for the use of our toolbox offer some novel results. The first example revisits the case of monetary policy coordination in a two-country model to confirm that our approach replicates well-known results in the literature and extends these results by highlighting their sensitivity to the choice of policy instrument. For the second example, a central bank and a macroprudential regulator are assigned distinct objectives in a model with financial frictions. Lack of coordination leads to large welfare losses even if technology shocks are the only source of fluctuations.