Imposing a Turnout Threshold in Referendums
Imposing a Turnout Threshold in Referendums
复制标题
在公投中设定投票率门槛
DOI：
10.1007/s11127-010-9670-1
复制
发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
Masafumi Shinmyo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yoichi Hizen;Masafumi Shinmyo
我们构造了一个是/否公投的模型，只有当选民投票率大于预定值时，结果才有效。在这样的投票率门槛下，存在三种类型的均衡，在每一种均衡中，赞成现状的选民要么去投票站投票，要么弃权，要么使用混合策略。我们表明，如果阈值足够高，弃权比投票更有可能实现现状，而对于任何阈值水平，混合策略均衡之一最不可能实现现状。
We construct a model of a yes/no referendum for which the outcome is valid only if the voter turnout rate is greater than a predetermined value. With such a turnout threshold, three types of equilibria exist, in each of which the voters who favor the status quo either go to the polls, abstain, or use mixed strategies. We show that abstaining is more likely to realize the status quo than going to the polls if the threshold is sufficiently high, whereas one of the mixed-strategy equilibria is least likely to realize the status quo for any level of threshold.