SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL
SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL
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DOI：
10.1086/467037
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发表时间：
1983-01-01
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
JENSEN, MC
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
FAMA, EF;JENSEN, MC
没有FATT，在一项活动中生存下来的组织形式，就是以最低的价格交付客户所需的产品，同时弥补成本。我们的目标是解释组织的生存特征，其特征是所有权和控制权分离--这个问题一直困扰着从亚当·斯密到伯利、Means、Jensen和Meckling等公司的学生。2更准确地说，我们关注的是组织的生存，在这些组织中，重要的决策者并不承担其决策的大量财富影响。我们认为，在大公司中观察到的决策和风险承担职能的分离，在其他组织中也是常见的，如大型专业合伙企业、金融互助组织和非营利组织。我们认为，决策和风险承担职能的分离在这些组织中得以存在，部分原因是专业化的好处
ABSENT fiat, the form of organization that survives in an activity is the one that delivers the product demanded by customers at the lowest price while covering costs.'Our goal is to explain the survival of organizations characterized by separation of" ownership" and" control"-a problem that has bothered students of corporations from Adam Smith to Berle and Means and Jensen and Meckling. 2 In more precise language, we are concerned with the survival of organizations in which important decision agents do not bear a substantial share of the wealth effects of their decisions.We argue that the separation of decision and risk-bearing functions observed in large corporations is common to other organizations such as large professional partnerships, financial mutuals, and nonprofits. We contend that separation of decision and risk-bearing functions survives in these organizations in part because of the benefits of specialization of