A Generation Removed: The Fostering and Adoption of Indigenous Children in the Postwar World
A Generation Removed: The Fostering and Adoption of Indigenous Children in the Postwar World
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被移走的一代:战后世界土著儿童的养育和收养
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发表时间:
2016
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通讯作者:
N. Lowe
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作者:
N. Lowe
marriages is by no means clear, precisely because marriage is not necessarily seen in the individualist way as many of the majority population may do. This of course has always been the concern about over-hasty employment of the criminal law in this area, and it is perhaps unfortunate that recent developments on this came too late for comment in this useful contribution. This raises the question as to how the state can accommodate such differing views of marriage within a single institution. It appears that a growing number of Muslim marriages fall outside the state institution because the parties do not complete the civil formalities necessary if their marriage took place in an unregistered mosque (and many are not registered). Rajnaara C. Akhtar (Chapter 8) sought to discover why this is so, and the prevalent reason seemed to be that they did not seem to see any need to do this. For them, the religious marriage was the important thing. The result, of course, is that the couple are considered unmarried cohabitants according to the civil law, without the benefits being legally married brings, especially on death or divorce. Akhtar does not offer a solution to this. My view is that the law should extend its recognition to all religious marriages, wherever solemnised, provided they are officiated by an authorised person, as in Scotland. This is in direct opposition to the view put forward by Peter W. Edge in Chapter 12, who describes it as a ‘co-production’ between the state and religious communities, and would confine legal recognition to an entirely civil proceeding. The Law Commission suggested this in 1973 but Edge would go further and not even call it marriage. But I think that, provided certain conditions are met, the state should recognise religious marriages, thereby (probably) extending access to the civil law of marriage and also demonstrating its approval of a range of communities and community practices within a single, but diverse, society. This leaves open questions of how civil marriage should be defined. This is partly addressed by Jonathan Herring in Chapter 13, who rightly castigates the apparent obsession with the ability to have heterosexual intercourse. This is a remnant from its distant roots in canon law, most of which have been swept away, and fortunately are of very little current practical importance. This is another example of social norms overcoming legal ones, and Herring’s preference for care to replace sex as being ‘at the heart of marriage’ almost certainly reflects such norms. It is less clear, however, how this could be expressed in legal provisions. Other contributions examine in detail the ritual symbolism in Church of England weddings by Sarah Farrimond (Chapter 10), and a discourse analysis by Rosie Harding in Chapter 11 of the language used in debates in the House of Lords second readings of the bills that became the Civil Partnership Act 2004 and the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013. In sum, by highlighting social perspectives, this collection provides a welcome reminder that marriage is far more than a legal institution and the contributions are a source of fascinating information pertinent to discussions about its future. John Eekelaar Emeritus Fellow, Pembroke College, Oxford john.eekelaar@law.ox.ac.uk