Guaranteed Physical Security with Restart-Based Design for Cyber-Physical Systems
Guaranteed Physical Security with Restart-Based Design for Cyber-Physical Systems
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DOI：
10.1109/iccps.2018.00010
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发表时间：
2018-04
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Fardin Abdi;Chien-Ying Chen;M. Hasan;Songran Liu;Sibin Mohan;M. Caccamo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Fardin Abdi;Chien-Ying Chen;M. Hasan;Songran Liu;Sibin Mohan;M. Caccamo
构成网络物理系统（CPS）核心的物理工厂通常具有严格的安全要求。最近的攻击表明，网络入侵可能导致这些工厂的安全受到损害-从而导致物理损坏。在本文中，我们演示了如何确保工厂的安全，即使系统受到损害。我们利用了这样一个事实，即由于惯性，对手无法以瞬间的方式破坏物理系统（即使完全控制了软件）;事实上，它通常需要有限的时间（甚至相当长的时间）。这个属性，再加上em系统范围的重启，用于为系统强制一个安全的（和安全的）操作窗口。硬件信任根进一步降低了攻击者破坏我们机制的能力。我们证明了我们的方法，使用两个现实的系统-一个3自由度（3-DoF）的直升机和模拟仓库温度控制单元。我们还表明，我们的系统是强大的，对多种模拟攻击-基本上攻击者是无法妥协的CPS的安全性。
Physical plants that form the core of the Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) often have stringent safety requirements. Recent attacks have shown that cyber intrusions can result in the safety of such plants being compromised – thus leading to physical damage. In this paper, we demonstrate how to ensure safety of the plant even when the system gets compromised. We leverage the fact that due to inertia, an adversary cannot destabilize the physical system (even with complete control of the software) in an instantaneous manner; in fact, it often takes finite (even considerable time). This property, coupled with em system-wide restarts is used to enforce a secure (and safe) operational window for the system. A hardware root-of-trust, further decreases the ability for attackers to compromise our mechanisms. We demonstrate our approach using two realistic systems – a 3 degree of freedom (3-DoF) helicopter and a simulated warehouse temperature control unit. We also show that our system is robust against multiple emulated attacks – essentially the attackers are not able to compromise the safety of the CPS.