STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS IN 4 COALITION SITUATIONS
STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS IN 4 COALITION SITUATIONS
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DOI：
10.1002/bs.3830230308
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发表时间：
1978-01-01
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
MURNIGHAN, JK
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
MURNIGHAN, JK
这项研究在四种不同的游戏中测试了群体层面系统决策中的四种联盟行为模型，每种游戏由五个人玩。每场比赛在玩家之间建立了不同的权力分配。联盟频率和参与者被纳入特定联盟时的收益数据支持 Komorita 和 Chertkoff (1973) 的讨价还价理论，而不是 Komorita (1974) 的加权概率模型和 Gamson (1961) 的最小资源理论。当每个玩家在每场游戏中获得的总体收益被用作衡量玩家讨价还价成功与否的标准时，Roth-Shipley 和加权概率模型的预测得到了不同的支持。最后，结果表明“强即是弱”现象可能会在何时发生。在特定游戏中具有相同沙普利值但资源不同的玩家支持“强即是弱”。具有不同沙普利值的玩家都支持“力量就是力量”的结论。球员们的报告为这一现象的根本原因提供了可能的解释。
This study tested four models of coalition behavior in decision making on systems at the group level, in four different games, each of which was played by five individuals. Each game established a different distribution of power among the players. Data for coalition frequencies and for the payoffs of the players when they were included in a particular coalition supported Komorita & Chertkoff s (1973) bargaining theory over Komorita's (1974) weighted probability model and Gamson's (1961) minimum resource theory. When the overall payoffs received by each of the players in each game were used as a measure of the player's success in bargaining, the predictions of the Roth‐Shipley and the weighted probability models received mixed support. Finally, the results suggested when the “strength is weakness” phenomenon might be expected to occur. Players with equal Shapley values but different resources within a particular game supported “strength is weakness.” Players with different Shapley values supported a “strength is strength” conclusion. Reports of the players provided a possible explanation of the underlying causes of this phenomenon.