Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: International Evidence
Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: International Evidence
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所有权结构和公司绩效：国际证据
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发表时间：
1999
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通讯作者：
David Y. Suk
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作者：
Ki C. Han;S. Lee;David Y. Suk
内部人持股对公司绩效影响的实证结果是喜忧参半的。以前的研究只关注美国公司，因此，它们的影响是有限的。我们开发了更广泛的内部人持股和公司业绩之间的关系的见解，通过检查来自七个主要工业化国家的公司业绩，使用各种措施的公司业绩。我们的研究结果表明，控制其他因素，内部人持股有一个混合的，虽然弱，对公司业绩的影响。引言本文探讨了所有权结构对公司业绩的影响，使用各种会计比率，包括市场账面比率作为衡量业绩的指标。继詹森和麦克林（Meckling，1976）之后，对公司业绩和股东之间股份分配之间关系的兴趣在金融文献中不断发展。根据詹森和麦克林（1976）的观点，管理者的自然倾向是按照自己的最大利益分配公司资源，这可能与外部股东的利益发生冲突。但是，随着经营者股权的增加，经营者与外部股东的利益更加一致，经营者与股东之间的冲突有可能得到解决。因此，管理层持股有助于解决代理问题，提高公司绩效。然而，一些研究表明，管理层的所有权并不总是对公司业绩产生积极影响。法马和詹森（1983）证明了拥有足够股份以控制董事会的经理人可以侵占公司财富的各种可能性。例如，大股东可以给自己支付过高的薪水，与他控制的其他公司谈判“甜心”交易，或者投资于净现值为负的项目。Stulz [1988]解释了拥有大的区块如何使管理者更容易站稳脚跟。因此，管理者更多的持股会增加内部选民的权力，但会降低外部选民影响公司业绩的权力。Morck，Shleifer，and Vishny [1988]，McConnell and Servaes [1990]等人实证研究了股权结构对公司绩效的影响。Morck、Shleifer和Vishny [1988]估计了一个分段线性回归，其中因变量是托宾的q比率（托宾[1969]），作为公司业绩的代理，主要自变量是公司内部人拥有的股份比例。尽管这些研究在具体结果上存在分歧，但它们都认为q比率与内部人持股程度之间的关系不是线性的：在内部人持股的一定范围内，q比率与内部人持股程度呈正相关，而在另一范围内，q比率与内部人持股程度呈负相关，从而支持了内部人持股并不总是对公司绩效产生积极影响的观点。McConnell和Servaes [1990]使用不同的方法，也证明了q比率与内部人所有权程度呈非线性关系。有趣的是，McConnell和Servaes的研究表明，q比率与机构持股程度正相关，表明机构持股对公司绩效有积极影响。他们认为，在机构股东的存在下，管理者的保护将更加困难。本文旨在重新考察股权结构对公司绩效的影响。我们试图通过使用更广泛的样本，采用各种绩效指标，并采用比以前的研究问题较少的方法来研究内部人持股与公司绩效之间的关系，以解决混合的结果。本研究在两个重要方面有所不同。首先，我们使用的国际数据包括来自G7国家的2,000多家公司。…
The empirical results on the effect of insider shareholdings on firm performance are mixed. Previous studies focus solely on U.S. firms, and therefore, their implications are limited. We develop more generalized insights into the relation between insider shareholdings and firm performance by examining the performance of firms from the seven major industrialized countries using various measures of firm performance. Our results show that, controlling for other factors, insider shareholdings has a mixed, albeit weak, effect on firm performance. INTRODUCTION This paper examines the effect of ownership structure on corporate performance, using various accounting ratios including market-tobook ratios as measures of performance. Following Jensen and Meckling [1976], interest in the relation between corporate performance and the allocation of shares among shareholders has continued to evolve in the finance literature. According to Jensen and Meckling [ 1976], managers' natural tendency is to allocate the firm's resources in their own best interests, which may conflict with the interests of outside shareholders. As managers' equity ownership increases, however, their interests coincide more closely with those of outside shareholders, and hence the conflicts between managers and shareholders are likely to be resolved. Thus, management's equity ownership helps resolve the agency problems and improve the firm's performance. However, several studies suggest that management's ownership does not always have a positive effect on corporate performance. Fama and Jensen [1983] demonstrate various possibilities that managers who own enough stock to dominate the board of directors could expropriate corporate wealth. A large-block shareholder could, for example, pay himself an excessive salary, negotiate 'sweetheart' deals with other companies he controls, or invest in negative-net-present-value projects. Stulz [1988] explains how owning large blocks makes it easier for managers to be entrenched. Thus, greater stock ownership by managers increases the power of the internal constituency, but decreases the power of the external constituency in influencing corporate performance. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny [1988], and McConnell and Servaes [1990], among others, empirically examine the effect of ownership structure on corporate performance. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny [1988] estimate a piece-wise linear regression in which the dependent variable is Tobin's q ratio (Tobin [1969]) as a proxy for corporate performance, and the primary independent variable is the fraction of shares owned by corporate insiders. While these studies do not agree on detailed results, they both report that the relationship between q ratio and the degree of insider ownership is not linear: in some range of insider ownership, q ratio is positively related to insider ownership, but, in other range, a negative relationship is found. Thus, the studies support the view that insider ownership does not always have a positive effect on corporate performance. Using a different methodology, McConnell and Servaes [1990] also demonstrate that q ratio is nonlinearly related to the degree of insider ownership. Interestingly, McConnell and Servaes show that q ratio is positively related to the degree of institutional ownership, indicating a positive effect of institutional ownership on corporate performance. They suggest that managers' entrenchment would be more difficult with the existence of institutional shareholders. The objective of this paper is to reexamine the effect of ownership structure on corporate performance. We seek to resolve the mixed results by examining the relation between insider ownership and firm performance using a broader sample, adopting various performance measures, and applying less problematic methodologies than earlier studies. This research is different in two important aspects. First, we use the international data which include more than 2,000 firms from G7 countries. …