Devolving Skills: The Case of the Apprenticeship Grant for Employers*

Devolving Skills: The Case of the Apprenticeship Grant for Employers*
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技能转移:雇主学徒补助金案例*

DOI:
10.1111/1475-5890.12238
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发表时间:
2020
期刊:
影响因子:
7.3
通讯作者:
Cavaglia C
Cavaglia C
中科院分区:
经济学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Cavaglia C

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权力下放的一个理由是,地方决策者可能处于有利地位,可以根据当地情况调整国家政策。我们测试这种调整是否有助于实现计划的目标,在雇主学徒补助金的情况下。最初是一项旨在激励雇主雇用学徒的国家方案,实施几年后的改革使一些地方当局在该计划的运作方式上具有谈判的灵活性。我们考虑了国家计划的影响,然后使用差异中的差异方法来测试灵活性是否导致了相对于对照组的下放地区学徒开始数量的增加。我们发现,灵活性没有任何影响。有暗示性证据表明,这是因为在错误的边际上谈判了灵活性。
One rationale for devolution is that local decision makers may be well placed to adapt national policies to the local context. We test whether such adaptation helps meet programme objectives in the case of the Apprenticeship Grant for Employers. Originally a national programme, aimed at incentivising employers to take on apprentices, reforms a few years into operation gave some Local Authorities negotiated flexibilities in how the scheme operated. We consider the impact of the national scheme and then use a difference‐in‐differences approach to test whether flexibility led to an increase in the number of apprenticeship starts in devolved areas relative to control groups. We find that flexibility had zero effect. There is suggestive evidence that this is because flexibilities were negotiated on the wrong margins.
DOI: --
发表时间: 1984
期刊:
影响因子: --
作者:
W. Merrilees
通讯作者: W. Merrilees