The Simple Analytics of Job Displacement Insurance
The Simple Analytics of Job Displacement Insurance
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失业保险简单分析
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发表时间：
2019
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
D. O. Parsons
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作者：
D. O. Parsons
在美国，失业对长期工人的收入构成了严重威胁，这既是因为失业，也是因为再就业工资减少。尽管全额保险既需要失业救济金，也需要工资保险，但供应困难限制了实际损失保险，而离职方案通常包括部分失业保险和定期(固定金额)遣散费。这种二维包的设计需要一个系统的方法，以及一个衡量充分性的广义替换率。找工作的道德风险和裁员的道德风险(解雇成本)，无论是单独还是结合在一起，都可能带来严重的合同问题。经济理论为在这种复杂的计划环境中整合这些保险工具提供了实践指南。一个重要的含义是：考虑到美国失业造成的收入损失结构，遣散费应该随着公司服务年限的增长而增加，这是很常见的，而失业保险福利水平应该下降，但事实并非如此。
Job displacement in the U.S. is a serious threat to the earnings of long-tenured workers, through both (i) unemployment spells and (ii) reduced reemployment wages. Although full insurance requires both unemployment benefits and wage insurance, supply difficulties limit actual-loss insurance, and separation packages typically include partial unemployment insurance and scheduled (fixed sum) severance pay. The design of this two dimensional package requires a systems approach as well as a generalized replacement ratio measure of adequacy). Job search moral hazard and layoff moral hazard (firing costs), individually and in combination, introduce potentially serious contracting concerns. Economic theory provides a practical guide to the integration of these insurance instruments in this complex planning environment. One important implication: given the structure of earnings losses at displacement in the U.S., severance pay should increase with length of service in the firm ("tenure"), which is common, and unemployment insurance benefit levels should fall, which is not.