Competition between Physical and Electronic Content Retailers
Competition between Physical and Electronic Content Retailers
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3804604
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发表时间：
2021-03
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Yuta Kittaka;Noriaki Matsushima;Fuyuki Saruta
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yuta Kittaka;Noriaki Matsushima;Fuyuki Saruta
我们研究了一个模型，在该模型中，垄断供应商通过具有批发价合同的传统零售商和具有代理合同的在线零售商分销两种类型的产品。由于这样的代理合同消除了双重边缘化问题，在线零售商比传统零售商具有成本优势。鉴于在线零售商的优势，我们还考虑了传统零售商可能提出的一个要求：在线零售商的零售价格不低于传统零售商的批发价。我们得到了以下结果。在线零售商对供应商议价能力的提高对两家零售商有利，但对供应商不利。在保护传统零售商的要求下，批发价严格高于基准模型。零售商的均衡价格也严格高于基准模型中的价格。这一要求有利于供应商和在线零售商，但损害了传统零售商。
We investigate a model in which a monopoly supplier distributes two types of its product through a traditional retailer with a wholesale price contract and an online retailer with an agency contract. Because such an agency contract eliminates the double marginalization problem, the online retailer has a cost advantage over the traditional retailer. Given the advantage of the online retailer, we also consider a possible request by the traditional retailer: the retail price of the online retailer is not smaller than the wholesale price for the traditional retailer. We obtain the following results. An increase in the online retailer's bargaining power over the supplier benefits the two retailers but harms the supplier. Under the request to protect the traditional retailer, the wholesale price is strictly higher than that in the baseline model. The retailers' equilibrium prices are also strictly higher than those in the baseline model. The request benefits the supplier and the online retailer, but harms the traditional retailer.