Sovereign defaults: Information, investment and credit ☆
Sovereign defaults: Information, investment and credit ☆
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主权违约：信息、投资和信贷☆
DOI：
10.1016/j.jinteco.2008.07.008
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Guido Sandleris
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Guido Sandleris
一个免于破产程序、在违约情况下几乎没有资产可被扣押的主权政府，为什么要偿还外国债权人？相应地，外国债权人为什么要借钱给主权国家？本文发现，即使在没有制裁的情况下，向主权国家提供贷款也可以在一枪游戏中出现的一般条件。进一步证明了正借贷在池化和分离均衡中都可以持续。通过这种方式，它清楚地表明，制裁和声誉考虑这两种经典解释都不是强制偿还的必要条件。信息披露是产生这些结果的关键机制。还款/违约决定被解读为政府用来向国内外代理人传达有关经济基本面信息的信号。政府的回报会影响代理人对他们的期望。通过对基本面预期的影响，违约可能导致国内外投资下降，并导致国内信贷市场出现信贷紧缩。政府偿还债务以避免这些成本，但当受到负面冲击时，可能会（在均衡状态下）违约。
Why would a sovereign government, immune from bankruptcy procedures and with few assets that could be seized in the event of a default, ever repay foreign creditors? And, correspondingly, why do foreign creditors lend to sovereigns? This paper finds general conditions under which, even in the absence of sanctions, lending to sovereigns can emerge in a single shot game. Furthermore, it shows that positive borrowing can be sustained both in pooling and separating equilibria. In this way, it makes clear that neither sanctions nor reputation considerations, the two classical explanations, are necessary to enforce repayment. Information revelation is the crucial mechanism for these results. The repayment/default decision is interpreted as a signal used by the government to communicate information to domestic and foreign agents about the fundamentals of the economy. Governments repay to affect agents' expectations about them. A default, through its effect on expectations about fundamentals, can generate a decline in foreign and domestic investment and a credit crunch in domestic credit markets. Governments repay to avoid these costs, but may default (in equilibrium) when hit by a negative shock.