HALC: A Real-time In-sensor Defense against the Magnetic Spoofing Attack on Hall Sensors
HALC: A Real-time In-sensor Defense against the Magnetic Spoofing Attack on Hall Sensors
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DOI：
10.1145/3545948.3545964
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发表时间：
2022-10
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Anomadarshi Barua;M. A. Faruque
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Anomadarshi Barua;M. A. Faruque
在过去的十年中，已经发表了几篇论文，以提供对传感器的故意欺骗的防御。然而，这些防御措施只适用于那些欺骗信号，这些欺骗信号具有与被测量的原始信号不同的频率。如果欺骗攻击信号（i）具有等于原始信号的频率的频率，（ii）具有零频率，并且（iii）足够强以驱动传感器输出接近其饱和区域，则这些防御将不起作用。更具体地说，这些防御措施不是针对被动霍尔传感器的磁欺骗攻击而设计的。我们的工作开始填补这一空白，提供一个防御被动霍尔传感器上的磁欺骗攻击。我们提出的防御HALC可以实时检测和包含所有类型的强和弱磁欺骗，例如恒定，正弦和脉动磁场。HALC在0 - 150 kHz的频率范围内可实现高达9000 G的外部磁欺骗，而现有的防御措施仅在欺骗信号具有与被测量的原始信号不同的频率时才起作用。HALC利用模拟和数字核心来实现恒定的计算复杂度O（1）。此外，它是低功耗（约1.9 mW），低成本（约12美元），并可以在传感器硬件中实现。我们已经在来自四个不同制造商的十个不同行业使用的霍尔传感器上测试了HALC，以证明其有效性，并发现在每个测试用例中，攻击前后信号之间的相关系数都大于0.91。此外，我们在两个实际系统中证明了其功效：并网太阳能逆变器和每分钟转数测量系统。通过实验我们发现，HALC是一个强大的实时防御对被动霍尔传感器的磁欺骗攻击。
Several papers have been published over the last ten years to provide a defense against intentional spoofing to sensors. However, these defenses would only work against those spoofing signals, which have a separate frequency from the original signal being measured. These defenses would not work if the spoofing attack signal (i) has a frequency equal to the frequency of original signals, (ii) has zero frequency, and (iii) is strong enough to drive the sensor output close to its saturation region. More specifically, these defenses are not designed for a magnetic spoofing attack on passive Hall sensors. Our work begins to fill this gap by providing a defense against the magnetic spoofing attack on passive Hall sensors. Our proposed defense HALC can detect and contain all types of strong and weak magnetic spoofing, such as constant, sinusoidal, and pulsating magnetic fields, in real-time. HALC works up to ∼ 9000 G of external magnetic spoofing within a frequency range of 0 - 150 kHz, whereas existing defenses work only when the spoofing signals have a separate frequency from the original signal being measured. HALC utilizes the analog and digital cores to achieve a constant computational complexity O(1). Moreover, it is low-power (∼ 1.9 mW), low-cost (∼ $12), and can be implemented in the sensor hardware. We have tested HALC on ten different industry-used Hall sensors from four different manufacturers to prove its efficacy and found that the correlation coefficient between the signals before and after the attack is greater than 0.91 in every test case. Moreover, we demonstrate its efficacy in two practical systems: a grid-tied solar inverter and a rotation-per-minute measurement system. We find through experiments that HALC is a robust real-time defense against a magnetic spoofing attack on passive Hall sensors.