Posterior and anterior cortex - where is the difference that makes the difference?
Posterior and anterior cortex - where is the difference that makes the difference?
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DOI:
10.1038/nrn.2016.105
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发表时间:
2016-10-01
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Tononi, Giulio
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
Koch, Christof;Massimini, Marcello;Tononi, Giulio
We thank Sandberg, Frässle and Pitts for their perceptive letter about our Review (Neural correlates of consciousness: progress and problems. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 17, 307–321 (2016)) 1. The correspondents raise the issue of future directions (Future directions for identifying the neural correlates of consciousness. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. http://dx. doi. org/10.1038/nrn. 2016.104 (2016)) 2, which, owing to space limitations, we addressed in the accompanying Opinion article 3. In that article, we describe a principled approach—integrated information theory—that characterizes the physical substrate of consciousness as a maximum of intrinsic cause–effect power. The ensuing research strategy aims at locating such a maximum in the brain, and at determining its borders, its constituting elements, its temporal scale and its activity variables.In the Review, we argue that it is time to consider a posterior'hot zone', rather than a fronto-parietal network, as the likely substrate of many aspects of phenomenal experience. The notion that fronto-parietal networks may be the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) was derived primarily from between-state and task-related contrasts that were obtained through neuroimaging studies confounded by executive control and through paradigms conflating consciousness with responsiveness. Moreover, this notion is inconsistent with the effects of extensive bilateral lesions of the prefrontal cortex, indicating that the front of the brain is not necessary for being conscious. By contrast, the importance of the posterior hot zone is highlighted by within-state, no-task paradigms that decouple experience from immediate responsiveness and report, such as studies contrasting consciousness and unconsciousness within the same state of sleep 4, and by elegant no-report paradigms 5, 6, 7. This interpretation is consistent with evidence obtained from selective lesions of the posterior cortex.