Posterior and anterior cortex - where is the difference that makes the difference?

Posterior and anterior cortex - where is the difference that makes the difference?
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DOI:
10.1038/nrn.2016.105
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发表时间:
2016-10-01
期刊:
Nature reviews. Neuroscience
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Tononi, Giulio
Tononi, Giulio
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
Koch, Christof;Massimini, Marcello;Tononi, Giulio

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我们感谢桑德伯格、弗雷斯勒和皮茨就我们的评论(意识的神经关联:进展和问题)发表的有见地的信函。纳特。神经科学牧师。17,307-321(2016))1.记者提出了未来方向的问题(识别意识的神经关联的未来方向。纳特。神经科学牧师。Http://dx.多伊。ORG/10.1038/NRN.2016.104(2016.104))2,由于篇幅所限,我们在所附的意见第3条中谈到了这一点。在该条中,我们描述了一种原则性的方法--综合信息论--将意识的物质基础描述为内在因果力量的最大限度。随后的研究策略旨在确定大脑中这样一个最大值的位置,并确定其边界、构成要素、时间尺度和活动变量。在综述中,我们认为是时候考虑将后面的“热区”而不是额顶网络作为现象经验许多方面的可能底物。额顶网络可能是意识的神经关联(NCC)的概念主要来自于状态和任务相关的对比,这些对比是通过被执行控制混淆的神经成像研究以及通过将意识与反应相结合的范式获得的。此外,这一概念与前额叶皮质广泛的双侧损伤的影响不一致,表明大脑的前部不是意识所必需的。相比之下,后热区的重要性通过将体验与即时反应和报告分离的状态内、无任务范式突显出来,例如在同一睡眠状态下对比意识和无意识的研究4,以及优雅的无报告范式5、6、7。这一解释与从选择性后皮质损伤中获得的证据一致。
We thank Sandberg, Frässle and Pitts for their perceptive letter about our Review (Neural correlates of consciousness: progress and problems. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 17, 307–321 (2016)) 1. The correspondents raise the issue of future directions (Future directions for identifying the neural correlates of consciousness. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. http://dx. doi. org/10.1038/nrn. 2016.104 (2016)) 2, which, owing to space limitations, we addressed in the accompanying Opinion article 3. In that article, we describe a principled approach—integrated information theory—that characterizes the physical substrate of consciousness as a maximum of intrinsic cause–effect power. The ensuing research strategy aims at locating such a maximum in the brain, and at determining its borders, its constituting elements, its temporal scale and its activity variables.In the Review, we argue that it is time to consider a posterior'hot zone', rather than a fronto-parietal network, as the likely substrate of many aspects of phenomenal experience. The notion that fronto-parietal networks may be the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) was derived primarily from between-state and task-related contrasts that were obtained through neuroimaging studies confounded by executive control and through paradigms conflating consciousness with responsiveness. Moreover, this notion is inconsistent with the effects of extensive bilateral lesions of the prefrontal cortex, indicating that the front of the brain is not necessary for being conscious. By contrast, the importance of the posterior hot zone is highlighted by within-state, no-task paradigms that decouple experience from immediate responsiveness and report, such as studies contrasting consciousness and unconsciousness within the same state of sleep 4, and by elegant no-report paradigms 5, 6, 7. This interpretation is consistent with evidence obtained from selective lesions of the posterior cortex.