Slow Response of Societies to New Problems: Causes and Costs
Slow Response of Societies to New Problems: Causes and Costs
复制标题
社会对新问题反应缓慢：原因和成本
DOI：
10.1007/pl00021504
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发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
3.7
通讯作者：
W. Brock
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Scheffer;Frances Westley;W. Brock
人类社会面临着源源不断的新问题。其中许多问题是由有限的社会部门造成的，但对整个社会造成了“溢出成本”。在这里，我们展示了机制的组合如何倾向于延迟对这种情况的有效监管。显然，问题可能会在一段时间内未被发现，特别是如果问题不同于过去所经历的问题。然而，至少同样重要的是，在解决问题之前处理各种动态，因为在早期阶段有系统地缓慢抑制问题的社会将付出高昂的总体代价。在这里，我们展示了多种机制的组合如何往往会延迟有效的监管。显然，问题可能在一段时间内未被发现，尤其是与过去经历的问题不同的情况下。然而，即使一个问题被专家认识到，在社会普遍认识到应该采取措施之前，由于意见变化的滞后，时间可能会很长。这导致了观点的突然但较晚的转变，就像库恩的范式转变所描述的那样。我们使用数学模型并回顾了经验证据，表明这种现象在复杂问题和具有强大社会控制的社会中尤为明显，而像魅力型领导者这样的关键人物可能会催化早期的意见转变，减少问题和解决方案之间的时间滞后。一个可信的权威对一个问题的淡化，以及同时发生的问题引起人们的注意，也可能会抑制意见的转变。即使问题得到普遍认可，实际的监管也可能姗姗姗姗来。我们认为，如果缺乏中央决策机构，并且涉及从不受监管的现状中受益的不成比例的强大利益相关者，那么最后阶段的延迟往往会更长。
Human societies are confronted with a continuous stream of new problems. Many of these problems are caused by a limited sector of society but cause “spillover costs” to society as a whole. Here we show how a combination of mechanisms tends to delay effective regualtion of such situations. Obviously, problems may remain undetected for some time, especially if they are unlike those experienced in the past. However, it is at least as important to address the dynamics preceding the solution because societies that are systematically slow in suppressing problems in the early phases will pay a high overall cost. Here we show how a combination of mechanisms tends to delay effective regulation. Obviously, problems may remain undetected for some time, especially if it is unlike those experienced in the past. However, even if a problem is recognized by experts, the time lag before society in general recognizes that something should be done can be long because of the hysteresis in change of opinion. This causes abrupt but late shifts in opinion, much as described for Kuhn’s paradigm shifts. We use a mathematical model and review empirical evidence to show that this phenomenon will be particularly pronounced for complex problems and in societies that have strong social control, whereas key individuals such as charismatic leaders may catalyze earlier opinion shifts, reducing the time lag between problem and solution. An opinion shift may also be inhibited by downplay of a problem by a credible authority and by competition for attention by simultaneously occurring problems. Even if a problem is generally recognized, actual regulation may come late. We argue that this last phase of delay tends to be longer if a central decision-making authority is lacking and if disproportionately powerful stakeholders that benefit from the unregulated status quo are involved.