BAM BAM!! On Reliability of EMFI for in-situ Automotive ECU Attacks

BAM BAM!! On Reliability of EMFI for in-situ Automotive ECU Attacks
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巴姆巴姆!!

DOI:
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发表时间:
2020
期刊:
IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
W. He
W. He
中科院分区:
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文献类型:
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作者:
J. Breier;S. Bhasin;W. He

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相似文献

电磁故障注入(EMFI)是一种用于执行故障注入攻击的著名技术。虽然这类攻击在实验室条件下可能很容易演示,但有关它们在现实生活环境中的适用性的信息对于ECU的设计者来说至关重要,以了解应该花费多少精力来防御它们。这项工作以最近(2019年)的一个汽车ECU为目标,并分析了实验室条件下使用的目标微控制器,然后将攻击过渡到类似于车库长凳的真实世界的“就地”攻击。这项具体工作似乎与MPC55xx和MPC56xx系列中的几个设备有关,这些设备是专注于汽车的PowerPC设备。
Electromagnetic Fault Injection (EMFI) is a well-known technique for performing fault injection attacks. While such attacks may be easy demonstrated in a laboratory condition, information about the applicability of them to real-life environments is critical for designer of ECUs to understand the effort that should be spent on protecting against them. This work targets a recent (2019) automotive ECU, and analyzes the target microcontroller used in laboratory conditions, and then transitions the attack to a real-world “in-situ” attack similar to a garage bench. The specific work appears relevant to several devices in the MPC55xx and MPC56xx series, which are automotive-focused PowerPC devices.