Kant’s Transcendental Deduction
Kant’s Transcendental Deduction
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康德的先验演绎
DOI：
10.1515/kant.1977.68.1-4.383
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发表时间：
1977
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
W. H. Bossart
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
W. H. Bossart
最近的许多英语哲学文献都与哲学中的“康德转向”有关。尽管它局限于第一部《批判》中所处理的问题，但对康德重新产生的兴趣主要集中在先验演绎的两个方面。其中第一个涉及什么有时被称为“先验的论点”。这种论证经常与康德联系在一起，特别是与演绎的动作联系在一起，以至于它的成功或失败经常被当作衡量批判认识论成功或失败的标准。第二个主题是对演绎的另一个方面的否定，康德自己称之为“主观的”，这是一个非常可疑的自我心理理论，对康德的思想主线来说是不重要的，他声称这是完整性和必要性。在下文中，我将对康德的这些解读提出质疑。
A good deal of recent philosophical literature in English has been concerned with the "Kantian turn* in philosophy. Insofar äs it confines itself to matters dealt with in the first Critique, this renewed interest in Kant centers primarily about two aspects of the transcendental deduction. The first of these concerns what is sometimes called a "transcendental argument". This kind of argument is so often associated with Kant, especially with the moves of the deduction, that its success or failure is frequently taken äs a measure of the success or failure of the critical epistemology äs well. The second theme is the dismissal of another aspect of the deduction, whidi Kant himself calls "subjective", äs a highly questionable psychological theory of the seif which is inessential to Kant's main line of thought for which he claims both completeness and necessity. In what follows I shall question these readings of Kant.