Hiding violence to deal with the state
Hiding violence to deal with the state
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隐藏暴力与国家打交道
DOI：
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Angélica Durán
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Cruz;Angélica Durán
2012年，萨尔瓦多的两个主要街头帮派Mara Salvatrucha 13和Barrio 18达成了一项休战协议，该协议被认为在一年内将杀人率降低了50%以上。虽然帮派休战仅持续了18个月，但凶杀案的大幅减少令观察家感到困惑，他们认为青年帮派无法协调暴力，特别是考虑到以前和类似的旨在达成协议的努力没有取得类似的结果。这篇文章解决了一个问题所提出的难题萨尔瓦多休战的成功：在什么条件下，谈判或与犯罪组织有效地减少犯罪暴力？通过比较萨尔瓦多和哥伦比亚麦德林的停战协定和刑事协定，我们认为，刑事协定可以减少凶杀案，当（a）他们直接涉及国家作为一个管理员的激励措施，以减少暴力和（B）犯罪组织已经实现了组织凝聚力和领导力，促进领土控制和战略可靠性。这些条件允许组织管制暴力。我们的论点强调了暴力是如何进行的重要性，更重要的是，它的可见性，以充分了解契约内的犯罪行为。报告还指出，拉丁美洲和其他地区寻求减少犯罪和政治暴力的替代办法的国家可以从中吸取教训。
In 2012, the two major street gangs in El Salvador, Mara Salvatrucha 13 and Barrio 18, struck a truce credited with reducing homicide rates by more than 50% in one year. Although the gang truce held for only 18 months, the significant reduction in homicides puzzled observers that believed youth gangs were unable to coordinate violence, especially considering that previous and similar efforts aimed at striking agreements did not achieve similar results. This article addresses a question posed by the puzzle of the Salvadoran truce’s success: under what conditions do negotiations between or with criminal organizations effectively reduce criminal violence? By comparing truces and criminal pacts in El Salvador and in Medellin, Colombia, we argue that criminal pacts can reduce homicides when (a) they directly involve the state as an administrator of incentives to reduce violence and (b) criminal organizations have achieved organizational cohesion and leadership that facilitate territorial control and strategic dependability. These conditions allow organizations to regulate violence. Our argument highlights the importance of how violence is performed and, more importantly, its visibility, to fully understand criminal behavior within pacts. It also points to potential lessons for countries seeking alternatives to reduce criminal and political violence in Latin America and elsewhere.