OnionDNS: a seizure-resistant top-level domain
OnionDNS: a seizure-resistant top-level domain
复制标题
OnionDNS：抗抢占顶级域名
DOI：
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发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
3.2
通讯作者：
Patrick Traynor
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Nolen Scaife;Henry Carter;Patrick Traynor
域名系统（DNS）提供将规范名称映射到IP地址的关键服务。认识到这一点，一些当事方越来越多地试图通过将目标从DNS中除名来对目标进行“域名扣押”。这种行动往往没有向这些域名的所有者提供正当程序，最近的立法提案可能使这种做法变得更糟。我们通过创建OnionDNS来解决这个问题，OnionDNS是互联网的匿名顶级域名和解析服务。我们的解决方案依赖于在Tor中建立一个运行DNS的隐藏服务，并使用各种机制来确保高性能架构，为解析的记录提供强大的完整性保证。然后，我们介绍了我们的匿名域名注册商，并详细说明了安全地将服务传输到另一方的协议。最后，我们还进行性能和法律的分析，以进一步证明这种方法的鲁棒性。在这样做的过程中，我们表明，从DNS域名的除名可以减轻在一个有效的和安全的方式。
The Domain Name System (DNS) provides the critical service of mapping canonical names to IP addresses. Recognizing this, a number of parties have increasingly attempted to perform “domain seizures” on targets by having them delisted from DNS. Such operations often occur without providing due process to the owners of these domains, a practice made potentially worse by recent legislative proposals. We address this problem by creating OnionDNS, an anonymous top-level domain and resolution service for the Internet. Our solution relies on the establishment of a hidden service running DNS within Tor and uses a variety of mechanisms to ensure a high-performance architecture with strong integrity guarantees for resolved records. We then present our anonymous domain registrar and detail the protocol for securely transferring the service to another party. Finally, we also conduct both performance and legal analyses to further demonstrate the robustness of this approach. In so doing, we show that the delisting of domains from DNS can be mitigated in an efficient and secure manner.