Designing a market-like entity: Economics in the politics of market formation
Designing a market-like entity: Economics in the politics of market formation
复制标题
设计类似市场的实体：市场形成政治中的经济学
DOI：
10.1177/0306312713493962
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发表时间：
2013
影响因子：
3
通讯作者：
D. Breslau
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
D. Breslau
最近关于经济学与经济制度关系的著作认为，经济学是经济制度的组成部分，尤其是市场的组成部分。经济社会学将经济学视为一种相互竞争的学科框架或一种意识形态，与之相反，“表演性”文献将经济学严肃地视为一系列市场建设实践。本文通过分析经济学在市场形成政治中的作用，论证了这些观点的兼容性。它提供了一个新机构形成的案例研究：与美国的电力批发市场相连的容量市场。该案展示了经济框架如何通过为围绕市场规则的斗争的合法行为强加一套特定的条款来塑造市场政治。
Recent work on the relationship of economics to economic institutions has argued that economics is constitutive of economic institutions, and of markets in particular. In opposition to economic sociology, which has treated economics as a competing disciplinary frame or an ideology, the ‘performativity’ literature takes economics seriously as a set of market-building practices. This article demonstrates the compatibility of these perspectives by analyzing the role of economics in the politics of market formation. It presents a case study of the formation of a new institution: capacity markets connected to wholesale electricity markets in the United States. The case demonstrates how economic framing shapes the politics of markets by imposing a specific set of terms for the legitimate conduct of the struggle over market rules.