Overusing a bypass under cost-based access regulation: underinvestment with spillovers
Overusing a bypass under cost-based access regulation: underinvestment with spillovers
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DOI：
10.1007/s11149-014-9259-6
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发表时间：
2015-02
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Keizo Mizuno;I. Yoshino
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Keizo Mizuno;I. Yoshino
我们解释了如何在基础设施升级投资不足的情况下加剧了基于成本的接入费的接入监管。当对现有企业征收基于成本的接入费时，由于投资回报不足，现有企业投资基础设施升级的动力很弱。当溢出程度大、旁路的生产成本低、在位者的投资成本高时，在位者的投资不足会导致选择生产效率高的技术的进入者过度使用旁路。旁路的过度使用降低了在位者的利润，这进一步降低了在位者的投资动机。因此，过度使用旁路会造成基础设施升级投资不足的恶性循环。
We explain how underinvestment in infrastructure upgrades is aggravated under access regulation with a cost-based access charge. When a cost-based access charge is imposed on an incumbent, the incumbent has a weak incentive to invest in infrastructure upgrades due to insufficient rewards for the investment. Then, the incumbent’s underinvestment induces the overuse of a bypass by an entrant that chooses productively efficient technology, when the degree of spillover is large, the production cost of the bypass is low, and the incumbent’s investment cost is high. The overuse of a bypass decreases the incumbent’s profits, which further reduces the incumbent’s incentive for investment. Thus, the overuse of a bypass generates a vicious cycle of underinvestment in infrastructure upgrades.