Corporate Governance in Germany: The Role of the Banks
Corporate Governance in Germany: The Role of the Banks
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德国的公司治理：银行的作用
DOI：
10.2307/840568
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发表时间：
1992
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Theodor Baums
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Theodor Baums
* THEODOR BAUMS 是德国奥斯纳布吕克大学法学博士、教授。本文于 1992 年 5 月 1 日至 2 日在斯坦福大学（经济政策研究中心）会议上发表，题为“公司治理：新问题和新解决方案”。 Richard Buxbaum、Robert Cooter、Paul Davies、Melvin Eisenberg、David Haddock、Mark Roe 和 Kenneth Scott 对本文的前稿提出了有益的评论。本文的目的是提供有关德国公司治理体系的信息，并找出其缺点、可能的优点和悬而未决的问题，而不是发展原创理论、制定政策建议或回顾理论文献。 1. 无限合伙企业（“offene Handelsgesellschaft”）；有限合伙企业（“Kommanditgesellschaft”）。 2.“Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung”。 3.“股份公司”。 4. 关于债务和公司控制问题，例如，0. Williamson, “Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance,” 43 J. of Finance 567-91 (1988)； Aghion & Bolton，“企业的财务结构和控制问题”，33《欧洲经济评论》286-93 (1989)； C. Mayer，“金融系统、公司财务和经济发展”，载于 R. Glenn Hubbard（主编），《非对称信息、公司财务和投资》307-32 (1990)； Mayer 和 Alexander，“银行和证券市场：德国和英国的企业融资”，工作论文（1990 年）以及 F. Allen 的几篇文章的调查，“债务和股权的变化性质：财务视角”，Kopcke 和 Rosengren（编辑），债务和股权之间的区别是否正在消失？，美联储。波士顿储备，会议系列第 33 期，第 12-38 页（1989 年）；银行家信贷对于德国企业融资的重要性参见。名词59，下文。 5.关于银行对工业企业股权投资的合法性，参见。名词28，下。
* THEODOR BAUMS is Dr. jur., Professor at the University of Osnabruck, Germany. This paper was presented at the Stanford University (Center for Economic Policy Research) conference on "Corporate Governance: New Problems and New Solutions," May 1-2, 1992. Helpful comments have been given on a former draft of this paper by Richard Buxbaum, Robert Cooter, Paul Davies, Melvin Eisenberg, David Haddock, Mark Roe, and Kenneth Scott. The purpose of this article is to provide information on the German corporate governance system and to identify its drawbacks, possible advantages and open questions, rather than to develop an original theory, formulate policy recommendations, or review the theoretical literature. 1. Unlimited partnership ("offene Handelsgesellschaft"); limited partnership ("Kommanditgesellschaft"). 2. "Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung". 3. "Aktiengesellschaft". 4. On the issue of debt and corporate control cf., e.g., 0. Williamson, "Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance," 43 J. of Finance 567-91 (1988); Aghion & Bolton, "The Financial Structure of the Firm and the Problem of Control," 33 European Economic Review 286-93 (1989); C. Mayer, "Financial Systems, Corporate Finance, and Economic Development," in R. Glenn Hubbard (ed.), Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance and Investment 307-32 (1990); Mayer & Alexander, "Banks and Securities Markets: Corporate Financing in Germany and the UK," Working Paper (1990) and the survey of several articles in F. Allen, "The Changing Nature of Debt and Equity: A Financial Perspective," in Kopcke & Rosengren (eds.), Are the Distinctions between Debt and Equity Disappearing?, Fed. Reserve of Boston, Conference Series No. 33, pp. 12-38 (1989); for the importance of bankers' credits for German corporate finance cf. n. 59, infra. 5. For the legality of equity investments of banks in industrial firms cf. n. 28, infra.