A game theoretic analysis on block withholding attacks using the zero-determinant strategy
A game theoretic analysis on block withholding attacks using the zero-determinant strategy
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采用零行列式策略的扣块攻击博弈论分析
DOI：
10.1145/3326285.3329076
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Cheng, Xiuzhen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Hu, Qin;Wang, Shengling;Cheng, Xiuzhen
在比特币支持开放矿池的激励系统中，区块扣发攻击会带来巨大的安全威胁。在本文中，我们研究池之间的相互攻击，因为这决定了整个分布式系统的宏观效用。现有的关于台球的交互式攻击的研究通常采用传统的博弈论方法，将局中人的策略看作是纯粹的、平等的，忽略了强有力的策略的存在以及相应的有利的博弈结果。在这项研究中，我们利用零决定（ZD）策略来分析任何两个池之间的块扣留攻击，其中ZD采用者对其对手和自己的预期收益具有单边控制权。在这种情况下，我们面临着以下问题：谁可以采用ZD战略？单独或同时？ZD播放器可以实现什么？为了回答这些问题，我们推导出两个池可以单独或同时采用ZD策略的条件，并证明了有效性。据我们所知，我们是第一个使用ZD策略来分析池之间的块扣留攻击。
In Bitcoin's incentive system that supports open mining pools, block withholding attacks incur huge security threats. In this paper, we investigate the mutual attacks among pools as this determines the macroscopic utility of the whole distributed system. Existing studies on pools' interactive attacks usually employ the conventional game theory, where the strategies of the players are considered pure and equal, neglecting the existence of powerful strategies and the corresponding favorable game results. In this study, we take advantage of the Zero-Determinant (ZD) strategy to analyze the block withholding attack between any two pools, where the ZD adopter has the unilateral control on the expected payoffs of its opponent and itself. In this case, we are faced with the following questions:who can adopt the ZD strategy? individually or simultaneously? what can the ZD player achieve?In order to answer these questions, we derive the conditions under which two pools can individually or simultaneously employ the ZD strategy and demonstrate the effectiveness. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use the ZD strategy to analyze the block withholding attack among pools.