Negotiating Intellectual Property Rights: Between Coercion and Dialogue
Negotiating Intellectual Property Rights: Between Coercion and Dialogue
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知识产权谈判：强制与对话之间
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发表时间：
2002
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通讯作者：
P. Drahoš
中科院分区：
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作者：
P. Drahoš
为什么英国在世纪开始了一段经济增长和帝国的旅程，而西班牙却开始了一段经济萎缩的旅程？一种观点认为，经济的长期表现与有效界定的产权有很大关系（North，1990）。以正确的方式设计产权将减少负外部性，允许讨价还价并避免公地悲剧。自然，这就引出了一个问题：一个社会如何实现一套有效的产权制度？经济学家道格拉斯·诺斯（Douglass North，1990）认为，这可能与民主制度有关。
Why did England in the seventeenth century begin a journey that would lead it to economic growth and empire while Spain began one that would lead to its economic contraction? One suggestion is that the long run performance of economies has much to do with efficiently defined property rights (North, 1990). Designed in the right way property rights will reduce negative externalities, allow for bargaining and avoid tragedies of the commons. Naturally, this gives rise to the question of how a society arrives at a set of efficient property rights. The economist, Douglass North (1990), suggests that it probably has something to do with democratic institutions.