Rowhammering Storage Devices
Rowhammering Storage Devices
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DOI：
10.1145/3465332.3470871
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发表时间：
2021-07
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Tao Zhang;Boris Pismenny;Donald E. Porter;Dan Tsafrir;A. Zuck
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文献类型：
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作者：
Tao Zhang;Boris Pismenny;Donald E. Porter;Dan Tsafrir;A. Zuck
像固态硬盘（SSDs）这样的外围设备正变得越来越复杂，以至于它们自身实际上已经是小型计算机了。我们的观点是，这种趋势产生了一种新型的攻击向量，即不受信任的软件可能会完全按照预期使用外围设备来实现非预期的目标。例如，我们着手对一个简化的主机端闪存转换层（FTL）的动态随机存取存储器（DRAM）组件进行“行锤”攻击，发出常规的输入/输出请求，以一种触发敏感信息泄露的方式来翻转位元。我们得出结论，这类攻击可能很快就会可行，并且我们认为系统需要有原则的方法来保护外围设备免受此类攻击。
Peripheral devices like SSDs are growing more complex, to the point they are effectively small computers themselves. Our position is that this trend creates a new kind of attack vector, where untrusted software could use peripherals strictly as intended to accomplish unintended goals. To exemplify, we set out to rowhammer the DRAM component of a simplified host-side FTL, issuing regular I/O requests that manage to flip bits in a way that triggers sensitive information leakage. We conclude that such attacks might soon be feasible, and we argue that systems need principled approaches for securing peripherals against them.