Further Evidence on the Strategic Timing of Earnings News: Joint Analysis of Weekdays and Times of Day
Further Evidence on the Strategic Timing of Earnings News: Joint Analysis of Weekdays and Times of Day
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关于收益新闻战略时机的进一步证据：工作日和一天中时间的联合分析
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2634875
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Alexander Vedrashko
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Roni Michaely;Amir Rubin;Alexander Vedrashko
使用组合的工作日和时间的一天（前，期间，和交易时间后）的收益公告，我们研究管理人员是否试图战略性地选择这些公告的时间。我们的文件，最糟糕的盈利消息是在周五晚上宣布，并找到强有力的证据表明，只有周五晚上的公告代表经理人的理性机会主义行为。周五晚间的公告之后是盈利消息方向的内幕交易和最大的盈利公告后漂移。经理们还试图减少与投资者的互动，并通过在周五晚间公布财报来隐藏更多的信息。我们发现，周五晚上的公告发生在晚上比其他晚上的公告，公司有一个减少的倾向，举行电话会议，和重大的公司重组事件是相对更有可能发生在周五晚上的公告。
Using combinations of weekdays and times of day (before, during, and after trading hours) of earnings announcements, we examine whether managers attempt to strategically time these announcements. We document that the worst earnings news is announced on Friday evening and find robust evidence that only Friday evening announcements represent managers’ rational opportunistic behavior. Friday evening announcements are followed by insider trading in the direction of earnings news and the largest post-earnings announcement drift. Managers also attempt to reduce interaction with investors and hide more than just earnings news by announcing on Friday evening. We find that Friday evening announcements occur later in the evening than announcements on other evenings, firms have a reduced propensity to hold conference calls, and major firm restructuring events are relatively more likely to occur after Friday evening announcements.