Breaking the Circuit Size Barrier for Secure Computation Under DDH
Breaking the Circuit Size Barrier for Secure Computation Under DDH
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DOI:
10.1007/978-3-662-53018-4_19
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发表时间:
2016-08
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影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Elette Boyle;N. Gilboa;Yuval Ishai
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文献类型:
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作者:
Elette Boyle;N. Gilboa;Yuval Ishai
Under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption, we present a 2-out-of-2 secret sharing scheme that supports a compact evaluation of branching programs on the shares. More concretely, there is an evaluation algorithmwith a single bit of output, such that if an inputis shared into, then for any deterministic branching programPof sizeSwe have thatexcept with at mostfailure probability. The running time of the sharing algorithm is polynomial innand the security parameter, and that ofis polynomial in, and. This applies as a special case to boolean formulas of sizeSor boolean circuits of depth. We also present a public-key variant that enables homomorphic computation on inputs contributed by multiple clients.The above result implies the following DDH-based applications:A secure 2-party computation protocol for evaluating any branching program or formula of sizeS, where the communication complexity is linear in the input size and only the running time grows withS.A secure 2-party computation protocol for evaluating layered boolean circuits of sizeSwith communication complexity.A 2-partyfunction secret sharingscheme, as defined by Boyle et al. (Eurocrypt 2015), for general branching programs (with inverse polynomial error probability).A 1-round 2-serverprivate information retrievalscheme supporting general searches expressed by branching programs.Prior to our work, similar results could only be achieved using fully homomorphic encryption. We hope that our approach will lead to more practical alternatives to known fully homomorphic encryption schemes in the context of low-communication secure computation.