Matters of Fact, and the Fact of Matter
Matters of Fact, and the Fact of Matter
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事实的问题和问题的事实
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发表时间:
2014
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通讯作者:
M. Lynch
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作者:
M. Lynch
My remarks in this brief commentary focus on Chris Calvert-Minor’s (2014) article on Karen Barad’s philosophical writings, and are only indirectly relevant to an assessment of Barad’s work. I have limited acquaintance with Barad’s writings, and even less with Nils Bohr’s. Barad explicitly borrows from Bohr’s theoretical writings when developing her version of feminist epistemology. Barad’s recruitment of Bohr to support her philosophy creates a dilemma for me and other readers who are not conversant with Bohr’s physics/philosophy. To my understanding, the general lessons that Barad draws from Bohr about physical phenomena seem roughly in line with Husserl’s conception of phenomena or Merleau-Ponty’s account of ‘‘the intertwining,’’ but it seems clear that neither Bohr nor Barad explicitly draws from transcendental or existential phenomenology. Barad also has developed her own vocabulary (as expressed with key terms such as ‘‘agential realism’’ and ‘‘intra-action’’), and she provides a feminist reading of Bohr, and so it seems necessary to pass through Bohr, quantum physics, and feminist epistemology before engaging directly with Barad’s philosophy. I have no particular problem with Barad’s Bohrian conception of phenomena as being the primordial ontological condition for any epistemic ‘‘cut’’ imposed between objective and subjective conditions, but I do not understand what is original about it or how it expresses a feminist standpoint. Consequently, it would be easy enough for Barad or one of her many admirers to dismiss what I say as a superficial misunderstanding that misses the subtlety and profundity of both Bohr’s and Barad’s epistemologies and is