A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining Model of Corporate Reorganizations
A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining Model of Corporate Reorganizations
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公司重组的简单非合作谈判模型
DOI：
10.1086/467889
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发表时间：
1991
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Randal C. Picker
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
D. Baird;Randal C. Picker
破产法的传统观点始于这样一种观点，即当公司债务人破产时，公司的不同一般债权人面临着集体行动问题。这些普通债权人现在是公司的剩余所有者。在传统观点下，破产法的设计首先是为了允许他们集体行动。“然而，这种对破产的描述未能反映出当一家少数人控股的公司需要重新安排其资本结构时经常面临的风险。一个优先债权人所欠的债务可能远远超过公司的价值。由于该债权人以公司的全部资产作为担保权益，因此有权优先于一般债权人。通常，破产主要是作为优先债权人和公司经理股东之间谈判的框架。之所以需要破产程序，主要是因为这些谈判不可能完全属于私人承包的范畴。如果公司的价值低于最优先债权人的债务，
THE traditional view of bankruptcy law begins with the idea that diverse general creditors of a firm face a collective action problem when their corporate debtor becomes insolvent. These general creditors now are the firm's residual owners. Under the traditional view, bankruptcy law is designed in the first instance to allow them to act collectively.' This characterization of bankruptcy, however, fails to capture what is often at stake when a closely held firm needs to rearrange its capital structure. The debt owed a single senior creditor may well exceed the value of the firm. Because of its security interest in all the firm's assets, this creditor is entitled to priority over the general creditors. Frequently, bankruptcy serves principally to frame the negotiations between this senior creditor and the firm's manager-shareholder. A bankruptcy proceeding is needed largely because these negotiations cannot be entirely the province of private contracting. If the firm is worth less than what the most senior creditor is owed, the general creditors