Decentralisation, clientelism and social protection programmes: a study of India's MGNREGA
Decentralisation, clientelism and social protection programmes: a study of India's MGNREGA
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DOI：
10.1080/13600818.2018.1467391
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发表时间：
2018-01-01
影响因子：
1.3
通讯作者：
Masiero, Silvia
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Maiorano, Diego;Das, Upasak;Masiero, Silvia
权力下放是否会促进庇护主义？如果是，通过什么机制？我们通过分析印度（也是世界上）最大的工作福利计划，即印度两个邦拉贾斯坦邦和安得拉邦的《圣雄甘地国家农村就业保障法案》（MGNREGA）来回答这些问题。这两个邦采用了截然不同的实施模式：拉贾斯坦邦的分权模式与安得拉邦的集权和官僚主导的模式形成鲜明对比。使用混合方法，我们发现在这两个州，当地实施者都有动力以依附方式分配 MGNREGA 工作。然而，在拉贾斯坦邦，由于分散的实施模式，这些激励措施更为强烈。因此，我们的定量证据表明，拉贾斯坦邦的依附主义问题比美联社更为严重。
Does decentralisation promote clientelism? If yes, through which mechanisms? We answer these questions through an analysis of India's (and the world's) largest workfare programme, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), in two Indian states: Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh (AP). The two states adopted radically different implementation models: Rajasthan's decentralised one stands in contrast with Andhra Pradesh's centralised and bureaucracy-led model. Using a mixed method approach, we find that in both states local implementers have incentives to distribute MGNREGA work in a clientelistic fashion. However, in Rajasthan, these incentives are stronger, because of the decentralised implementation model. Accordingly, our quantitative evidence shows that clientelism is more serious a problem in Rajasthan than in AP.