From evolutionary to strategic stability

From evolutionary to strategic stability
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DOI:
10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00078-4
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发表时间:
2003-11-01
影响因子:
1.6
通讯作者:
Ritzberger, K
Ritzberger, K
中科院分区:
经济学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Demichelis, S;Ritzberger, K

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如果在那里退出了该组件渐近稳定的广泛类别的进化选择动力学,则NASH平衡的连接成分(动态)可能会稳定。潜在稳定性的必要条件是该组件的索引与其欧拉的特征一致。其次,如果后者是非零的,则该组件包含一个战略稳定的集合。如果输入特性为零,则可以稍微扰动动力学(证明潜在的稳定性),以便将所有零关闭的零删除。因此,任何强大的潜在稳定组件都包含满足最强大理性改进标准的平衡。 (C)2003 Elsevier Science(美国)。版权所有。
A connected component of Nash equilibria is (dynamically) potentially stable if there exits an evolutionary selection dynamics from a broad class for which the component is asymptotically stable. A necessary condition for potential stability is that the component's index agrees with its Euler characteristic. Second, if the latter is nonzero, the component contains a strategically stable set. If the Enter characteristic would be zero, the dynamics (that justifies potential stability) could be slightly perturbed so as to remove all zeros close to the component. Hence, any robustly potentially stable component contains equilibria that satisfy the strongest rationalistic refinement criteria. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.