Turning a corner Preamble for "The relative native" by
Turning a corner Preamble for "The relative native" by
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《相对的本地人》的序言
DOI：
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. Holbraad
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
E. Castro;M. Holbraad
Eduardo Viveiros de Castro在他自己的葡萄牙语原版《相对本土》（2002）的序言中解释说，这篇文章的目的是在“元理论”上阐述他早期关于亚马逊万物有灵论的宇宙论的论点，该论点于1996年以葡萄牙语出版，1998年以英语出版，现在是JRAI的经典文章“宇宙指示和美洲印第安人的视角主义”在同年的剑桥系列讲座中得到了扩展。题为“亚马逊河流域和其他地方的宇宙学透视主义”，现已作为HAU大师班系列（2012）的第一卷提供。Viveiros de Castro从他的亚马逊透视主义理论中提取元理论含义的行动，让人想起罗伊·瓦格纳（Roy Wagner）的主张，即《文化的发明》（1981）提出了“认识论”（1981:xv），这与他早期对哈布达里比人社会生活中发明作用的民族志介绍（1973；参见Strathern 1980——瓦格纳-斯特拉瑟恩-维维罗斯元理论三联画中的中间术语）相对应。当然，这些“向元的移动”中的每一个都可以被看作是人类学“递归”的练习（Corsín jimmednez, in press; Holbraad 2013）。例如，瓦格纳通过将达利比的发明方式作为一种民族志模板来改造人类学本身的活动，即作为一种发明方式（并注意递归的双重循环），从而将人类学美拉尼西亚化，Viveiros de Castro在本文中同样试图将人类学亚马逊化，包括在人类学中采用亚马逊透视主义的核心原则，即，“观点”之间的差异应该从本体论而不是认识论的角度来看待。Viveiros de Castro在早期的人种学文章中写道，在美洲印第安人的宇宙观中，不同的物种并不以不同的方式看待同一件事（或“世界”），而是“以同样的方式看待……”不同的事物[或‘世界’]”（Viveiros de Castro 1998: 478）。同样，在人类学中，元理论的论点在这里阐述，人类学分析和民族志之间的区别
In his own preamble to the original Portuguese version of “The relative native” (2002), Eduardo Viveiros de Castro explains that the article’s aim is to elaborate “metatheoretically” upon his earlier arguments regarding the cosmology of Amazonian animism, published in Portuguese in 1996 and in English in 1998—the now classic JRAI article “Cosmological deixis and Amerindian perspectivism” expanded upon in his Cambridge lecture-series of the same year, titled “Cosmological perspectivism in Amazonia and elsewhere,” which is now available as Volume 1 of HAU’s Masterclass Series (2012). Viveiros de Castro’s move to extract metatheoretical implications from his theory of perspectivism in Amazonia recalls Roy Wagner’s claim that The invention of culture (1981) sets forth the “epistemology” (1981: xv) that corresponds to his earlier ethnographic presentation of the role of invention in Daribi social life in Habu (1973; see also Strathern 1980—the mediating term in a Wagner-Strathern-Viveiros metatheoretical triptych). Certainly, each of these “moves to meta” can be seen as exercises in anthropological “recursion” (Corsín Jiménez, in press; Holbraad 2013). For example, where Wagner Melanesianizes anthropology by taking Daribi manners of invention as an ethnographic template from which to reinvent the activity of anthropology itself, namely as a manner of invention also (and note the virtuously double circularity of the recursion), Viveiros de Castro’s equivalent attempt to Amazonianize anthropology in the present article consists in adopting for anthropology the core tenet of Amazonian perspectivism, namely, the idea that differences between “perspectives” are to be seen in ontological rather than epistemological terms. In Amerindian cosmologies, Viveiros de Castro writes in the earlier ethnological article, different species do not see the same thing (or “world”) in different ways, but rather “see in the same way . . . different things [or ‘worlds’]” (Viveiros de Castro 1998: 478). Similarly in anthropology, runs the metatheoretical argument elaborated here, the difference between anthropological analyst and ethnographic