The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
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DOI：
10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814
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发表时间：
2001-10
影响因子：
5.4
通讯作者：
J. Haidt
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Haidt
道德判断的研究一直被理性主义模型所主导，认为道德判断是由道德推理引起的。作者给出了4个理由来考虑道德推理不会导致道德判断的假设;相反，道德推理通常是一个事后的结构，在判断已经达成之后产生。社会直觉主义模型是作为理性主义模型的替代品提出的。这种模式是一种社会模式，因为它不强调个人所做的私人推理，而是强调社会和文化影响的重要性。该模型是一个直觉主义模型，因为它指出道德判断通常是快速自动评估（直觉）的结果。这个模型比理性主义模型更符合社会、文化、进化和生物心理学以及人类学和灵长类动物学的最新发现。
Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals and emphasizes instead the importance of social and cultural influences. The model is an intuitionist model in that it states that moral judgment is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions). The model is more consistent that rationalist models with recent findings in social, cultural, evolutionary, and biological psychology, as well as in anthropology and primatology.