Law Enforcement in a Federal System: On the Strategic Choice of Sanction Levels
Law Enforcement in a Federal System: On the Strategic Choice of Sanction Levels
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DOI：
10.1086/684309
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发表时间：
2016-01-01
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
Miceli, Thomas J.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Friehe, Tim;Miceli, Thomas J.
本文探讨了联邦系统中的执法，以解决威慑水平往往来自系统不同层面的决策这一现实。在这种情况下，犯罪转移形式的区域间外部性的存在导致地方一级过度的社会执法激励。我们表明，在地方一级的不协调的执法决定的不利影响可能会改善的战略选择，在中央一级的制裁。一个非最大的制裁可能是最优的，即使最大的制裁将是最优的，当中央层面选择所有的执法变量。这一结论表明，在联邦系统中，最佳执法必须考虑到相关行为体的战略相互依赖性。我们还讨论了决策权的其他安排是否可能与更高水平的福利。
This paper explores law enforcement in a federal system to address the reality that the level of deterrence often results from decision making at different levels of the system. In this setting, the presence of interregional externalities in the form of crime diversion induces socially excessive law enforcement incentives at the local level. We show that the adverse repercussions of uncoordinated enforcement decisions at the local level may be ameliorated by the strategic choice of the sanction at the central level. A nonmaximal sanction may be optimal, even though a maximal sanction would be optimal when the central level chooses all law enforcement variables. This conclusion shows that optimal law enforcement in a federal system must take account of the strategic interdependencies of relevant actors. We also discuss whether other arrangements of decision-making powers may be associated with higher levels of welfare.