Avoidable Cost: Ride a Double Auction Roller Coaster
Avoidable Cost: Ride a Double Auction Roller Coaster
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可避免的成本：乘坐双人拍卖过山车
DOI：
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发表时间：
1996
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
N. Wilcox
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Boening;N. Wilcox
双重拍卖交易机构在不同的边际成本市场结构中一直非常有效，无论是人类主体还是“零智能”机器人都在这些市场中。因此，许多研究者怀疑双向拍卖的绩效超越了市场结构和代理人策略。但作者表明，大量的可避免成本破坏了人类主体双向拍卖的效率和稳定性，这些低人类效率同时远高于零智力效率。他们的结果生动地说明了高度竞争的机构在必须科普非凸技术时所造成的潜在破坏。版权所有1996年美国经济协会。
The double auction trading institution has been highly efficient across diverse marginal-cost market structures, whether human subjects or 'zero-intelligence' robots populated those markets. Accordingly, many researchers suspect that double auction performance transcends market structure and agent strategy. But the authors show that large avoidable costs undermine the efficiency and stability of human subject double auctions and these low human efficiencies are simultaneously well above zero-intelligence efficiencies. Their results dramatically illustrate the potential havoc wrought by highly competitive institutions when they must cope with nonconvex technologies. Copyright 1996 by American Economic Association.