Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments
Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments
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自我选择和锦标赛的效率
DOI：
10.1111/j.1465-7295.2007.00094.x
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
M. Villeval
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Tor Eriksson;Sabrina Teyssier;M. Villeval
当外部强加时，排名顺序锦标赛具有激励特性，但其整体效率因性能的高方差而降低（Bull，Schotter和Weigelt 1987）。然而，由于绩效工资的效率既取决于其激励效果，也取决于其在员工中的选择效果（Lazear，2000），因此研究锦标赛的事前排序效果非常重要。本文报道了一项实验的结果，该实验分析了允许受试者自我选择不同的支付方案是否有助于减少锦标赛中表现的变化。我们发现，当受试者选择进入一个比赛，平均努力是较高的，受试者之间的方差是大大低于相同的支付方案时。排序提高了效率，因为它增加了竞争者的同质性。我们认为，劳动力市场的灵活性是相对绩效工资效率提高的重要条件。
When exogenously imposed, rank-order tournaments have incentive properties but their overall efficiency is reduced by a high variance in performance (Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt 1987). However, since the efficiency of performance-related pay is attributable both to its incentive effect and to its selection effect among employees (Lazear, 2000), it is important to investigate the ex ante sorting effect of tournaments. This paper reports results from an experiment analyzing whether allowing subjects to self-select into different payment schemes helps in reducing the variability of performance in tournaments. We show that when the subjects choose to enter a tournament, the average effort is higher and the between-subject variance is substantially lower than when the same payment scheme is imposed. Sorting is efficiency-enhancing since it increases the homogeneity of the contestants. We suggest that the flexibility of the labor market is an important condition for a higher efficiency of relative performance pay.