Unpredictability induced by unfocused games in evolutionary game dynamics
Unpredictability induced by unfocused games in evolutionary game dynamics
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.01.003
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发表时间：
2006-08-07
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Hashimoto, Koh
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hashimoto, Koh
进化博弈论是复制子系统的基础，其应用范围从动物行为和人类语言到生态系统和其他层次网络系统。大多数进化博弈动力学的研究都集中在一个单一的博弈上，但是，在许多情况下，我们看到许多博弈是同时进行的。我们构造了一个多个游戏的复制者方程，假设一个玩家的奖励是一个简单的总和，每个游戏的奖励。即使博弈的策略数不同，其动态也可以用一个复制因子方程来描述。我们在这里表明，当玩家同时玩几个游戏时，如果不知道整个其他游戏的结构，就不能确定单个游戏的命运。最吸引人的事实是，即使一个单一的游戏有一个ESS（进化稳定策略），游戏中的策略的相对频率并不总是收敛到ESS点时，其他游戏同时进行。(c)2006爱思唯尔有限公司保留所有权利。
Evolutionary game theory is a basis of replicator systems and has applications ranging from animal behavior and human language to ecosystems and other hierarchical network systems. Most studies in evolutionary game dynamics have focused on a single game, but, in many situations, we see that many games are played simultaneously. We construct a replicator equation with plural games by assuming that a reward of a player is a simple summation of the reward of each game. Even if the numbers of the strategies of the games are different, its dynamics can be described in one replicator equation. We here show that when players play several games at the same time, the fate of a single game cannot be determined without knowing the structures of the whole other games. The most absorbing fact is that even if a single game has a ESS (evolutionary stable strategy), the relative frequencies of strategies in the game does not always converge to the ESS point when other games are played simultaneously. (c) 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.