Naked Exclusion, Efficient Breach, and Downstream Competition
Naked Exclusion, Efficient Breach, and Downstream Competition
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赤裸裸的排斥、高效的违规、下游的竞争
DOI：
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Abraham L. Wickelgren
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Simpson;Abraham L. Wickelgren
Eric B. Rasmusen、J. Mark Ramseyer 和 John S. Wiley, Jr. (1991) 以及 Ilya R. Segal 和 Michael D. Whinston (2000) 之前的论文认为，在规模经济和多个买家存在的情况下，独家合同无法有效地阻止进入。我们首先表明，当买家是可以违反这些合同并支付预期损害赔偿的最终消费者时，这些结果不再成立。然而，我们随后表明，如果买家是下游竞争对手，即使不存在规模经济，并且即使违约是可能的，排他性合同也无法有效地阻止进入。 (JEL D86、K21、L11、L13、L14、L40)
Previous papers by Eric B. Rasmusen, J. Mark Ramseyer, and John S. Wiley, Jr. (1991) and Ilya R. Segal and Michael D. Whinston (2000) argue that exclusive contracts can inefficiently deter entry in the presence of scale economies and multiple buyers. We first show that these results no longer hold when buyers are final consumers who can breach these contracts and pay expectation damages. We then show, however, that exclusive contracts can inefficiently deter entry if buyers are downstream competitors, even in the absence of scale economies and even if breach is possible. (JEL D86, K21, L11 , L13, L14, L40)