Positive Health Externalities of Mandating Paid Sick Leave
Positive Health Externalities of Mandating Paid Sick Leave
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DOI：
10.1002/pam.22284
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发表时间：
2021-02-05
影响因子：
3.8
通讯作者：
Ziebarth, Nicolas R.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Pichler, Stefan;Wen, Katherine;Ziebarth, Nicolas R.
越来越多的经济学文献研究社会保险制度的最优设计和福利相关外部性的经验识别。在这篇文章中，我们测试了强制员工享受带薪病假是否降低了美国的流行性感冒样疾病(ILI)传播率以及肺炎和流感(P&I)死亡率。使用2010年至2018年州一周行政来源的独特汇编数据，以及差异差异方法，我们提出了准实验证据，表明病假工资规定导致人口层面医生认证的ILI比率下降。平均而言，ILI发生率在第一年下降了约11%，即每10万名患者每周有290例ILI病例。
A growing economic literature studies the optimal design of social insurance systems and the empirical identification of welfare-relevant externalities. In this paper, we test whether mandating employee access to paid sick leave has reduced influenza-like-illness (ILI) transmission rates as well as pneumonia and influenza (P&I) mortality rates in the United States. Using uniquely compiled data from administrative sources at the state-week level from 2010 to 2018 along with difference-in-differences methods, we present quasi-experimental evidence that sick pay mandates have causally reduced doctor-certified ILI rates at the population level. On average, ILI rates fell by about 11 percent or 290 ILI cases per 100,000 patients per week in the first year.