Local Government Tax and Product Competition and the Optimal Provision of Public Goods
Local Government Tax and Product Competition and the Optimal Provision of Public Goods
复制标题
地方政府税收和产品竞争与公共产品的优化供给
DOI：
10.1086/260017
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发表时间：
1973
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
M. Boskin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Boskin
任何特定城镇的位置通常都是由“利益相关方”之间的勾结决定的，目的是投机真实的房地产，并且它在其生命史（迄今为止）中继续作为一个真实的房地产“命题”来管理。“它的市政事务，它的公民自豪感，它的社区利益，它的房地产价值的覆盖面。
The location of any given town has commonly been determined by collusion between"interested parties" with a view to speculation in real estate, and it continues through its life-history (hitherto) to be managed as a real estate "proposition." Its municipal affairs, its civic pride, its community interest, coverage upon its real-estate values.
影响因子：
8.2
作者：
TIEBOUT, CM
通讯作者：
TIEBOUT, CM